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Debates on ECB independance[modifier | modifier le code]

The arguments in favour of this independence[modifier | modifier le code]

The debate on the independence of the ECB has its origins in the preparatory stages of the construction of the EMU. The German government agreed to go ahead if certain crucial guarantees were respected, such as a European Central Bank independent of national governments and shielded from political pressure along the lines of the German central bank. The French government, for its part, feared that this independence would mean that politicians would no longer have any room for manoeuvre in the process. A compromise was then reached by establishing a regular dialogue between the ECB and the Council of Finance Ministers of the euro area, the Eurogroupe.

The founding model of the ECB, as advocated by the German government, is explained in an article published in 1983 by two economists, Robert Barro and David Gordon[1]. According to them, the best way to combat the inflationary bias is for central banks to be credible. This credibility would be all the more important if the central banks were independent, so that decisions are not "contaminated" by politics. For economists, central banks should then have only one objective: to maintain a low inflation rate. For this system to work, it would then be necessary to assume that a monetary policy conducted in this way would have no effect on the real economy.

Since that publication, it has often been accepted that an independent institution to manage monetary policy can help to limit chronic inflation. This model was generalised in various variations at the national levels before being adopted at the European level[2].

The original European project, as intended by the founding fathers, did not attract the passions and favours of the European peoples. And rightly so. This project is thought out openly on purely technical subjects that are of little or no interest to public opinion. As a result, the founding fathers hoped that economic and ethical rationality could be exercised in all its fullness without political, ideological or historical obstacles. It is this rational messianism that the radical left has always fought against[3]. Moreover, this project is presented as heir to the Enlightenment and Reason, the reign of human rights, a modernist and voluntarist project stemming from the tradition of the 18th century[4].In this order of things, the independence of the ECB allowing a rational management of monetary questionnaires outside the political game is a blessing for the supporters of this doctrine. It is difficult, if not impossible, for them to conceive of a democratisation of the ECB by attaching to it a share of political control in its operation without distorting the "European Project", this bible, this unique political reason which has guided professionals in Europe for generations.

In this same idea, we can find in the "European Project" the Kantian tradition with a model of successful subordination of political power to the law, leading to what Habermas calls "the civilising force of democratic legalification". This Habermatian theory leads us once again to isolate supranational institutions from political games. Indeed, for Habermas, European politics, like national politics for that matter, finds it impossible to define ONE uniform people, but at best a pluriform people in constant opposition, each component against the other. For this author, popular sovereignty is illusory, as is the concept of "government by the people". He prefers the search for a broad consensus legitimized by the majority of democratically elected representatives of the people[5]. This explains his attachment to deflecting the influence of popular emotions from technical institutions, such as the ECB.

The arguments against too much independence[modifier | modifier le code]

An independence that would be the source of a democratic deficit.[modifier | modifier le code]

Demystify the independence of central bankers :According to Christopher Adolph (2009)[6], the alleged neutrality of central bankers is only a legal façade and not an indisputable fact . To achieve this, the author analyses the professional careers of central bankers and mirrors them with their respective monetary decision-making. To explain the results of his analysis, he utilizes he uses the "principal-agent" theory[7]. to explain that in order to create a new entity, one needs a delegator or principal (in this case the heads of state or government of the euro area) and a delegate or agent (in this case the ECB). In his illustration, he describes the financial community as a "shadow principale"[8]  which influences the choice of central bankers thus indicating that the central banks indeed act as interfaces between the financial world and the States. It is therefore not surprising, still according to the author, to regain their influence and preferences in the appointment of central bankers, presumed conservative, neutral and impartial according to the model of the Independent Central Bank (ICB)[9], which eliminates this famous "temporal inconsistency" [10]. Central bankers had a professional life before joining the central bank and their careers will most likely continue after their tenure. They are ultimately human beings. Therefore, for the author, central bankers have interests of their own, based on their past careers and their expectations after joining the ECB, and try to send messages to their future potential employers.

The crisis: an opportunity to impose its will and extend its powers :

- Its participation in the troika : Thanks to its three factors which explains its independence, the ECB took advantage of this crisis to implement, through its participation in the troika, the famous structural reforms in the Member States aimed at making , more flexible the various markets, particularly the labour market, which are still considered too rigid under the ordoliberal concept[11].

- Macro-prudential supervision : At the same time, taking advantage of the reform of the financial supervision system, the Frankfurt Bank has acquired new responsibilities, such as macro-prudential supervision, in other words, supervision of the provision of financial services[12].

-Take liberties with its mandate to save the Euro : Paradoxically, the crisis undermined the ECB's ordoliberal discourse "because some of its instruments, which it had to implement, deviated significantly from its principles. It then interpreted the paradigm with enough flexibly to adapt its original reputation to these new economic conditions. It was forced to do so as a last resort to save its one and only raison d'être: the euro. This Independent was thus obliged to be pragmatic by departing from the spirit of its statutes, which is unacceptable to the hardest supporters of ordoliberalism, which will lead to the resignation of the two German leaders present within the ECB: the governor of the Bundesbank, Jens WEIDMANN[13] and the member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Jürgen STARK[14] .

- Regulation of the financial system :  The delegation of this new function to the ECB was carried out with great simplicity and with the consent of European leaders, because neither the Commission nor the Member States really wanted to obtain the monitoring of financial abuses throughout the area. In other words, in the event of a new financial crisis, the ECB would be the perfect scapegoat[15].

- Capturing exchange rate policy : The event that will most mark the definitive politicization of the ECB is, of course, the operation launched in January 2015: the quantitative easing (QE) operation. Indeed, the Euro is an overvalued currency on the world markets against the dollar and the Euro zone is at risk of deflation. In addition, Member States find themselves heavily indebted, partly due to the rescue of their national banks. The ECB, as the guardian of the stability of the euro zone, is deciding to gradually buy back more than EUR 1 100 billion Member States' public debt. In this way, money is injected back into the economy, the euro depreciates significantly, prices rise, the risk of deflation is removed, and Member States reduce their debts. However, the ECB has just given itself the right to direct the exchange rate policy of the euro zone without this being granted by the Treaties or with the approval of European leaders, and without public opinion or the public arena being aware of this[16].

In conclusion, for those in favour of a framework for ECB independence, there is a clear concentration of powers. In the light of these facts, it is clear that the ECB is no longer the simple guardian of monetary stability in the euro area, but has become, over the course of the crisis, a "multi-competent economic player, at ease in this role that no one, especially not the agnostic governments of the euro Member States, seems to have the idea of challenging"[17]. This new political super-actor, having captured many spheres of competence and a very strong influence in the economic field in the broad sense (economy, finance, budget...).  This new political super-actor can no longer act alone and refuse a counter-power, consubstantial to our liberal democracies[18]. Indeed, the status of independence which the ECB enjoys by essence should not exempt it from a real responsibility regarding the democratic process.

The arguments in favour of a countervailing power[modifier | modifier le code]

In the aftermath of the euro area crisis, several proposals for a countervailing power were put forward, to deal with criticisms of a democratic deficit. For the German economist German Issing (2001) the ECB as a democratic responsibility and should be more transparent. According to him, this transparence could bring several advantages as the improvement of the efficiency and of the credibility by giving to the public adequate information. Others think that the ECB should have a closer relationship with the European Parliament which could play a major role in the evaluation of the democratic responsibility of the ECB[19]. The development of new institutions or the creation of a minister is another solution proposed:

A minister for the Eurozone ?[modifier | modifier le code]

The idea of a eurozone finance minister is regularly raised and supported by certain political figures, including Emmanuel Macron, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet and former European Commissioner Pierre Moscovici. For the latter, this position would bring "more democratic legitimacy" and "more efficiency" to European politics. In his view, it is a question of merging the powers of Commissioner for the Economy and Finance with those of the President of the Eurogroup.

The main task of this minister would be to "represent a strong political authority protecting the economic and budgetary interests of the euro area as a whole, and not the interests of individual Member States". According to the Jacques Delors Institute, its competences could be as follows:

  • Supervising the coordination of economic and budgetary policies
  • Enforcing the rules in case of infringement
  • Conducting negotiations in a crisis context
  • Contributing to cushioning regional shocks
  • Representing the euro area in international institutions and fora

For Jean-Claude Trichet, this minister could also rely on the Eurogroup working group for the preparation and follow-up of meetings in euro zone format, and on the Economic and Financial Committee for meetings concerning all Member States. He would also have under his authority a General Secretariat of the Treasury of the euro area, whose tasks would be determined by the objectives of the budgetary union currently being set up[20][21] .

This proposal was nevertheless rejected in 2017 by the Eurogroup, its President, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, spoke of the importance of this institution in relation to the European Commission.

Towards democratic institutions ?[modifier | modifier le code]

The absence of democratic institutions such as a Parliament or a real government is a regular criticism of the ECB in its management of the euro area, and many proposals have been made in this respect, particularly after the economic crisis, which would have shown the need to improve the governance of the euro area. For Moïse Sidiropoulos, a professor in economy: “The crisis in the euro zone came as no surprise, because the euro remains an unfinished currency, a stateless currency with a fragile political legitimacy”[22].

French economist Thomas Piketty wrote on his blog in 2017 that it was essential to equip the euro zone with democratic institutions. An economic government could for example enable it to have a common budget, common taxes and borrowing and investment capacities. Such a government would then make the euro area more democratic and transparent by avoiding the opacity of a council such as the Eurogroup.

Nevertheless, according to him "there is no point in talking about a government of the euro zone if we do not say to which democratic body this government will be accountable", a real parliament of the euro zone to which a finance minister would be accountable seems to be the real priority for the economist, who also denounces the lack of action in this area.

The creation of a sub-committee within the current European Parliament was also mentioned, on the model of the Eurogroup, which is currently an under-formation of the ECOFIN Committee. This would require a simple amendment to the rules of procedure and would avoid a competitive situation between two separate parliamentary assemblies. The former President of the European Commission had, moreover, stated on this subject that he had "no sympathy for the idea of a specific Eurozone Parliament".

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  1. ↑ R.Barro and D.Gordon, "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy", Journal of Monetary Economics, , p. 101-122
  2. ↑ A.BARBIER-GAUCHARD, M.SIDIROPOULOS, A.VAROUDAKIS, La gouvernance économique de la zone euro - Réalités et perspectives, Deboeck supérieur, (ISBN 978-2-8073-2010-9), p.39-40
  3. ↑ Christophe Bouillaud, « Bernard Bruneteau, Combattre l’Europe. De Lénine à Marine Le Pen, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2018, 303 pages », Politique européenne, vol. N° 62, no 4,‎ , p. 186 (ISSN 1623-6297 et 2105-2875, DOI 10.3917/poeu.062.0186, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  4. ↑ Christophe Bouillaud, « Bernard Bruneteau, Combattre l’Europe. De Lénine à Marine Le Pen, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2018, 303 pages », Politique européenne, vol. N° 62, no 4,‎ , p. 186 (ISSN 1623-6297 et 2105-2875, DOI 10.3917/poeu.062.0186, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  5. ↑ Aubert, Isabelle, 1979- éditeur intellectuel. Kervégan, Jean-François, éditeur intellectuel., Dialogues avec Jürgen Habermas (ISBN 978-2-271-11596-6 et 2-271-11596-5, OCLC 1065711045, lire en ligne)
  6. ↑ Adolph, Christopher, 1976-, Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Cambridge University Press, (ISBN 978-1-139-61681-2, 1-139-61681-1 et 978-1-139-62611-8, OCLC 844940155, lire en ligne)
  7. ↑ (en) Robert Elgie, « The politics of the European Central Bank: principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit », Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no 2,‎ , p. 186–200 (ISSN 1350-1763 et 1466-4429, DOI 10.1080/13501760110120219, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  8. ↑ Adolph, Christopher, 1976-, Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Cambridge University Press, (ISBN 978-1-139-61681-2, 1-139-61681-1 et 978-1-139-62611-8, OCLC 844940155, lire en ligne)
  9. ↑ Johnson, Peter A. (Peter Andrew), The government of money : monetarism in Germany and the United States (ISBN 978-1-5017-4453-2 et 1-5017-4453-4, OCLC 1112670669, lire en ligne)
  10. ↑ Adolph, Christopher, 1976-, Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Cambridge University Press, (ISBN 978-1-139-61681-2, 1-139-61681-1 et 978-1-139-62611-8, OCLC 844940155, lire en ligne)
  11. ↑ Coralie Delaume, « Où va la Banque centrale européenne ?: De la technique à la politique, sans la démocratie », Le Débat, vol. 187, no 5,‎ , p. 75 (ISSN 0246-2346 et 2111-4587, DOI 10.3917/deba.187.0075, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  12. ↑ Clément Fontan, « Chantiers de recherche transfert d'idée et résistances au changement : le cas de la banque centrale européenne après la crise. », Politique européenne, vol. 30, no 1,‎ , p. 225 (ISSN 1623-6297 et 2105-2875, DOI 10.3917/poeu.030.0225, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  13. ↑ Grégory Raymond, « "Jens Weidmann, l'homme qui dit "non" à toute l'Europe" », sur huffingtonpost.fr, Le Huffington Post, (consulté le )
  14. ↑ Reuters, « La démission de Jürgen Stark de la BCE vient au pire moment », sur https://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/, L'express, (consulté le )
  15. ↑ Frédéric Lebaron, « Quand le gardien du Temple devient le sauveur des marchés financiers », Savoir/Agir, vol. 27, no 1,‎ , p. 5 (ISSN 1958-7856 et 1958-5535, DOI 10.3917/sava.027.0005, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  16. ↑ Coralie Delaume, « Où va la Banque centrale européenne ? », Le Débat, vol. 187, no 5,‎ , p. 75 (ISSN 0246-2346 et 2111-4587, DOI 10.3917/deba.187.0075, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  17. ↑ Coralie Delaume, « Où va la Banque centrale européenne ?: De la technique à la politique, sans la démocratie », Le Débat, vol. 187, no 5,‎ , p. 75 (ISSN 0246-2346 et 2111-4587, DOI 10.3917/deba.187.0075, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  18. ↑ (en) Daniel Béland, « The Idea of Power and the Role of Ideas », Political Studies Review, vol. 8, no 2,‎ , p. 145–154 (ISSN 1478-9299 et 1478-9302, DOI 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2009.00199.x, lire en ligne, consulté le )
  19. ↑ Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie (1978-....)., Varoudakis, Aristomène (1958-....). et De Grauwe, Paul (1946-....)., La gouvernance économique de la zone euro : réalités et perspectives (ISBN 2-8073-2010-4 et 978-2-8073-2010-9, OCLC 1041143371, lire en ligne)
  20. ↑ T. Chopin, J.-F. Jamet, F.-X. Priollaud, « "Une Union politique pour l'Europe" », sur Fondation Robert Schuman, Question d'Europe, (consulté le )
  21. ↑ (en) Jean Claude Tirchet, « Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB on receiving the Karlspreis 2011 in Aachen », sur European central bank, (consulté le )
  22. ↑ « Accueil: Université de Strasbourg - Recherche », sur www.recherche.unistra.fr (consulté le )
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