Ignorance délibérée

Cet article est une ébauche concernant le droit et les États-Unis.

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En droit, l'ignorance délibérée se produit lorsqu'une personne cherche à éviter toute responsabilité civile ou pénale pour un acte illicite en ignorant intentionnellement des faits qui la rendraient responsable ou impliquée^[1]^[2]. Dans l'affaire États-Unis c. Jewell, le tribunal a jugé que la preuve d'une ignorance délibérée satisfaisait à l'exigence de connaissance de la possession criminelle et de l'importation de drogues.

Description[modifier | modifier le code]

Le concept s'applique également aux situations dans lesquelles les gens détournent intentionnellement leur attention d'un problème éthique considéré comme important par ceux qui utilisent l'expression, par exemple, parce que le problème est trop dérangeant pour que les gens veuillent qu'il domine leurs pensées, ou sachant que résoudre le problème nécessiterait des efforts considérables.

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Willful blindness per the IRS IRM Manual

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↑ (en) Alexander Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, Oxford University Press, 2019, 13 p. (ISBN 978-0-19-005657-5, lire en ligne) :
« The English courts apparently were the first to adopt it in criminal law. Writing in 1954, Edwards observed that "[f]or well-nigh a hundred years, it has been clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offence based on such words as . . . 'knowingly.'" He noted that "[s]o far as can be discovered, the case of R. v. Sleep was the first occasion in which judicial approval was given to" the willful ignorance doctrine... »
↑ Jonathan L. Marcus, « Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness », The Yale Law Journal, vol. 102, n^o 8,‎ 1993, p. 2231–2257 (ISSN 0044-0094, DOI 10.2307/796865, JSTOR 796865, lire en ligne) :
« Willful blindness first appeared as a substitute for actual knowledge in English case law over a century ago. A judge in Regina v. Sleep ruled that an accused could not be convicted for possession of "naval stores" unless the jury found that he "knew that the goods were government stores or wilfully shut his eyes to the fact. »

[1] (en) Alexander Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, Oxford University Press, 2019, 13 p. (ISBN 978-0-19-005657-5, lire en ligne) :
« The English courts apparently were the first to adopt it in criminal law. Writing in 1954, Edwards observed that "[f]or well-nigh a hundred years, it has been clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offence based on such words as . . . 'knowingly.'" He noted that "[s]o far as can be discovered, the case of R. v. Sleep was the first occasion in which judicial approval was given to" the willful ignorance doctrine... »

[2] Jonathan L. Marcus, « Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness », The Yale Law Journal, vol. 102, n^o 8,‎ 1993, p. 2231–2257 (ISSN 0044-0094, DOI 10.2307/796865, JSTOR 796865, lire en ligne) :
« Willful blindness first appeared as a substitute for actual knowledge in English case law over a century ago. A judge in Regina v. Sleep ruled that an accused could not be convicted for possession of "naval stores" unless the jury found that he "knew that the goods were government stores or wilfully shut his eyes to the fact. »

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