Émotivisme

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L'émotivisme est une perception méta-éthique affirmant que les attitudes émotionnelles sont exprimées à travers l'éthique de la parole[1],[2]. Influencée par la croissance de la philosophie analytique et l'empirisme logique du XXe siècle, la théorie est vivement expliquée par Alfred Jules Ayer dans son ouvrage de 1936 intitulé Langage, vérité et logique[3], mais son développement appartient historiquement à Charles Stevenson[4].

[modifier] Références

  1. (en) Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt, Ethical Theory, chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.
  2. (en) Ogden and Richards, Meaning, 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … [which] is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, 'This is good,' we merely refer to this, and the addition of "is good" makes no difference whatever to our reference … it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another." This quote appears in an extended form just before the preface of Stevenson's Ethics and Language.
  3. (en) Pepper, Ethics, 277: "[Emotivism] was stated in its simplest and most striking form by A. J. Ayer."
  4. (en) Brandt, Ethical Theory, 239, calls Stevenson's Ethics and Language "the most important statement of the emotive theory", and Pepper, Ethics, 288, says it "was the first really systematic development of the value judgment theory and will probably go down in the history of ethics as the most representative for this school."

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